A New RX for Iraq’s Splintered Union

Author: Daniel Zucker

Posted in Iraq 

World Security Network, November 28, 2006

For the last month, every political commentator worth his or her salt has written at least one column on Iraq. Some suggest withdrawal; others recommend increased commitment to solving Iraq’s problems. The correct solution to Iraq’s dilemma is being very hotly debated: should Iraq remain one unified nation or break apart into three autonomous regions bound together in a loose federation? Given the present divisions, what are the ramifications of either policy? Taking into account the complexity of the current situation as well as Iraq’s history since its creation as a modern nation-state some eighty years ago, what prescription stands a chance to heal Iraq? If we ignore it in its present condition, Iraq will bleed to death.

First some basics: between the three major ethnic/religious groups (Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds) and the many minority groups, Iraq has had no background of a natural unified history. Family, tribe, religion, and ethnicity have played larger roles than nationalism. That is not to say that nationalism is non-existent in Iraq; rather, one needs to realize that nationalism’s hold is not as strong as might be needed in order to keep sectarian elements from permanently tearing the Iraqi union apart.For the last month, every political commentator   worth his or her salt has written at least one column on Iraq. Some suggest withdrawal; others recommend increased commitment to solving Iraq’s problems. The correct solution to Iraq’s dilemma is being very hotly debated: should Iraq remain one unified nation or break apart into three autonomous regions bound together in a loose federation? Given the present divisions, what are the ramifications of either policy? Taking into account the complexity of the current situation as well as Iraq’s history since its creation as a modern nation-state some eighty years ago, what   prescription stands a chance to heal Iraq? If we ignore it in its present condition, Iraq willbleed to death.

The question that faces Iraqis today is this: is revenge more important than national union, or is the collective Iraqi Arab and Kurdish fear of Iranian domination a stronger unifier for these factions? At present it would seem that the desire for sectarian revenge is the stronger motivator. The Shiite rise to power following the elections of the last year have allowed Shiite political groups, both secular and Islamist, backed by the power of the principal Shiite Islamist militias—SICRI’s Badr Brigade and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al Mahdi—to flex their muscles and to revenge Sunni atrocities from the days of Saddam Hussein. With each round of killings by the Shiite militias, and counter killings by the Sunni militants, the Arab “half-life” of revenge gets extended by years, if not decades. It is difficult indeed to conceive that the hatreds that have been festering for so long will dissipate any time soon. Yet, despite the current rapprochement between Iraqi and Iranian Islamist Shiites, aided by Iran’s fifteen years of support (fiscal, psychological and logistical, as well as providing asylum) of their Iraqi Shiite co-religionists, it remains to be seen whether these Shiites of Iraq will continue to feel close to their Iranian benefactors should the threat of Sunni reprisals dissipate. Iranian policy has been one of stoking the fires of contention; it has proven to be a successful “divide and conquer” campaign in Iraq. The Sunnis are now coming to realize that such is the case and are beginning to fear the Iranians more than they dislike the Americans and British. In a telephone conversation on Wednesday, November 15th, Dr. Saleh al-Mutlak, chairman of the secular Sunni-led “Iraqi Front for National Dialogue”, told me that not only Sunnis, but also secular Shiites are looking for a way to bridge the divisions between the sects. How long it will take for the currently dominant Shiite religious parties of Iraq to come to a similar conclusion is anyone’s guess.

The Kurds in the north seem to be biding their time. Such patience would seem to be in their best interests as declaring national independence (as opposed to the de facto regional autonomy currently enjoyed) could easily incur major Turkish displeasure, not to mention similar reactions from Iran and Syria, and of course possible Shiite and Sunni Arab wrath at home in Iraq. In the crazy triangle of Iraqi politics, one must always be careful to avoid being “odd man out”.

Absent a strong man á la Saddam Hussein to force a union, it is likely that the sectarian violence will continue unabated and Iraq’s chances for unity could be drowned in blood. The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) will be the only winner until enough Iraqis realize what they are doing to themselves. Given the propensity for internecine bloodshed between Sunni and Shiite, it could be a long time before the two sects realize what Iran’s meddling is causing them to do to themselves. On the other hand, the IRI’s tendency to overplay its hand may cause the Iraqi Shiites to come to realize the situation sooner than we might normally expect.

The February 22, 2006 bombing of the sacred Shiite shrine of the Golden Mosque in Samarra by agents of the IRI should serve as an example of the underhanded way that the Tehran regime operates in Iraq. Unfortunately, thus far many within the Shiite community of Iraq seem more bent on revenging themselves on their Sunni neighbors than on thinking about the long term health and welfare of Iraq and its multi-cultural society. Let’s hope that they come to their senses soon, Inshallah, before they permit Iran’s agents to turn their country into a carbon copy of Tehran’s repressive Islamic Republic, something that has already occurred in the southern region around Basra.

Given the premise that Iraqis will not stop the blood-shedding on their own any time soon, now that the 2006 elections have changed the U.S. Congress to a Democratic Party-controlled legislature more prone to push for an early American withdrawal from Iraq, the question should be asked as to where “peacekeepers” can be found to help prevent the exponential increase in violence that a reduction in Allied forces will most likely entail. Put crudely: who will be next to put on the marshal’s badge in the Dodge City chaos that is Iraq today? The U.N. is probably the first candidate that comes to mind, but the tragedy in Darfur and Iran’s nuclear ambitions demonstrate that hell might freeze over long before the Security Council agrees to make a decision as to what it should do in Iraq. Besides, U.N. troops might still be seen as “outsiders” making them as unpopular with the Iraqis as the current Multi-National Forces led by the U.S. and the U.K. Given such concerns, it seems that a multi-national force, made up of member states of the Arab League (the strong first choice) or the Organization of the Islamic Conference (second choice) might be more acceptable to the Iraqi population. To help such a proposal to become reality, the U.S. and the European Union should volunteer to help fund such a “peacekeeper” force, thereby demonstrating the concern of the West for the welfare of all Iraqis and the territorial integrity of the nation-state of Iraq. Fellow Arabs or fellow Moslems would most likely prove to be more acceptable to the Iraqi population. Care, of course, needs to be taken to prevent such a force becoming a term-less occupier á la Syria’s “peacekeeping force” in Lebanon. Western funding would be a way of curtailing the possibilities of such an abuse of the situation.

Without a doubt, the first reaction to such a proposal will be a negative response by both the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. However, upon careful consideration, both may come to see that allowing Iraq to disintegrate into endless sectarian violence poses untenable risks to the region that make either organization’s involvement imperative. Additionally, such a positive involvement in peacekeeping operations would clearly enhance the reputation of the organization and its various member-states. For two groups that have not been taken as seriously as they would hope, this could be a golden opportunity to enhance their respective statures immeasurably. Concern for fellow Arabs and/or Moslems is often bandied about; here is a chance to put it into practice. Done correctly, Iraq would have the chance to emerge healthy and suitably neutral so as to pose no threat to its neighbors. Inshallah, Iraq could even become a reasonably liberal democracy as well.

Of course, a much quicker, simpler, and ultimately more effective solution would be to support the Iranian resistance movement in its efforts at changing the regime of the fascistic Islamist theocracy in Iran to a secular democracy. Were Iran to cease being an Islamic republic, its export of the Islamic revolution would cease, its often violent confrontation with the West would stop, the Iranian nuclear threat would dissipate, and the Islamist Shiite parties of Iraq would no longer have easy access to the means to repress the Sunni minority. Iraqis could then begin to rebuild their society. Do you think that Washington, London, and the West can get it right this time?

Professor Rabbi Daniel M. Zucker is Chairman and founder of Americans for Democracy in the Middle-East, a grassroots organization dedicated to teaching of the dangers posed by radical Islamic fundamentalism, and the need to promote genuine democratic institutions in the nations of the Middle-East as an antidote to such fundamentalism.