Sunday, September 25, 2016

Obama’s Iran Strategy Creates Support for the Islamic State

by Rabbi Daniel M. Zucker

American Thinker, August 27, 2016

Despite the obvious fallacy in Donald Trump’s recent statement that President Obama and his former Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton were the “founders of ISIS”, Hudson Institute scholar Michael Doran’s February 2, 2015 essay “Obama’s Secret Iran Strategy” demonstrates that a very flawed U.S. policy towards Iran actually helped create Sunni support for the radical Sunni Islamic State. Due to what former Senior Director at the National Security Council Elliott Abrams terms Obama’s “ideology”, the administration not only failed to comprehend Iranian culture and the absolutist theological nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran -- a blunder already begun in the Carter White House and perpetuated through all subsequent administrations -- but also compounded the error by believing that the mullah regime could be enticed to moderate its behavior.

A year after the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action we find Majlis Speaker of Parliament hard-liner Ali Larijani threatening that Iran may violate the JCPOA with a new startup of nuclear enrichment if any new sanctions are employed against Iran for its alleged nuclear activities, or those which UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon criticized in his report concerning ballistic missile tests. So too, the BfV, Germany’s domestic security apparatus, indicates that Iran has attempted to buy illegal nuclear technology since last year’s deal. Additionally, a recent report indicates that Iran has stepped up its cyberwar capabilities against the West. Thus, it’s clear that the White House’s hope that Iran would begin to change its behavior has proven erroneous. In reality, Iran’s leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not changed his opposition to the United States one iota. Indeed, the monies Iran has reaped from the deal have found their way to increased Iranian support  for the Syrian regime of Bashar el-Assad and its various terrorist proxies -- particularly Hizb’allah -- in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, and Gaza.

Having pulled all U.S. troops out of Iraq without stabilizing the situation between the warring Sunni and Shia populations, the administration not only allowed Iran to continue to support and fund the most radical Shia factions and their militias, but also gave the radical Dawa party’s Prime Minister Nouri Kamal al-Maliki the chance to suppress the Sunni minority. The result of allowing al-Maliki to continue his sectarian oppression of the Sunnis was to cause a large portion of Sunnis to become radicalized and support the formation of the Islamic State, particularly among former Baathist army officers and officials. As Iran’s radical Shia agenda became more prevalent in Iraq, leading both the Tehran-led Badr Organization militia and other Shia militias such as Asaib Ahl al Haq, or “League of the Righteous” to attack and assassinate Sunnis, particularly those that had any ties to the Saddam regime, the Sunnis reacted, and thus ISIS/the Islamic State found a steady supply of local recruits.

For the United States to win the war against the Islamic State, it is necessary not only to destroy it physically, but also to reverse the conditions that made it popular with a good portion of the Sunni masses. Unfortunately, the U.S. is relying on Iraq’s Shia Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) which too often commit atrocities against the fragmented Sunni minority.

As long as the current policy of relying on the Shia PMUs in its fight with Islamic State, the U.S. will fail to tame Iraq and arrest the sectarian wars. The PMUs are -- in essence -- Iranian proxies as their battlefield leadership is clearly demonstrated by the presence of Major General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC/Pasdaran), in Iraq at Takrit and Fallujah during the battles there. Soleimani not only advises but actually directs the battles and is aided by his own Qods Force troops as well as Shiite Fatemiyoun recruits from Afghanistan and Pakistan that have been employed to bolster Hizb’allah in Syria.

Accountability and strict discipline need to be enforced in American relations with Iraq. “Leading from behind” will not do in any manner whatsoever -- that’s an open invitation to the Islamic State to morph into another terrorist entity. Boots on the ground and officials in Baghdad to enforce strict compliance with a non-sectarian agenda will be required. With careful instruction and guidance we succeeded in the “Tribal Awakening” of 2006-2007 and the “Surge” of 2007-2008; future success requires similar diligence on our part along with that of the government of Iraq. But this time we need to stay the course and not retreat from the arena until Iraq is at peace with itself. Given the right support, the GOI will opt for a successful harmonious state. But with the long history of mutual Sunni-Shia animosity and the ferocity of both sides in attacking the other, it will not be simple or quickly achieved. However, if we withhold our support and supervision, Iraq will not achieve peace and will continue to be a weak client of Iran whose malevolent agenda is all too well known from the past thirteen years of experience.

Across the border in Syria, the situation is somewhat more complicated. The “moderate” opposition -- thought by the U.S. to be concentrated in the Syrian Free Army (SFA) -- has recently allied itself with jihadist militias fighting the Assad regime, especially in the current battle over Aleppo. Although the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, led by Abu Mohammed al-Golani, has split recently from al-Qaeda in order to form Jabhat Fatah el al-Sham as an umbrella organization of all non-Islamic State Sunni opposition to the Assad regime, the jihadi agenda it espouses has not changed at all. Like Islamic State, Jabhat Fatah el al-Sham seeks to remove the Assad regime and replace it with a Sunni Islamic state.

The only Syrian group working actively against Islamic State in Syria is the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces which recently took the city of Manbij from IS after a two-month siege. This Kurdish-dominated coalition is made up of the Syrian YPG and a variety of Arab minorities.

Success against the Islamic State both in Iraq and in Syria is hampered by our reliance on Iran’s Shiite axis in Iraq while attempting to remove Iran’s client in Syria. Our “friends” in these fights do not share our values nor do they have similar goals and objectives for final outcomes. Until we realize that every coalition action that we take has multiple repercussions because of our “allies” all-too-frequent misdeeds, we will continue to fail to bring any sense of calm to the area. As mentioned above, “leading from behind” is a guarantee of failure. Success will require tremendous effort, diligence and hands-on supervision in order to prevent sectarian violence against civilians, minorities, and the less devout.  And this problem will not be solved quickly no matter how much we wish it. But ignoring it will only allow it to fester and grow much more dangerous and lethal.


Rabbi Dr. Daniel M. Zucker, author of over one hundred articles on the Middle-East, is founder and Chairman of the Board of Americans for Democracy in the Middle-East, an organization dedicated to teaching the public about the dangers posed by radical Islamic fundamentalism. He may be contacted at contact@ADME.ws and/or ADME.chairman@aol.com.
The Fallacies Undergirding Current U.S. Policy towards Iran

by Rabbi Dr. Daniel M. Zucker

American Thinker, June 24, 2016

For the past thirty-seven years the United States of America has been approaching its policies toward the Islamic Republic of Iran with an almost messianic hope that the Khomeinist government of Iran can be weaned away from its anti-Western stance by a combination of sticks and carrots. Successive administrations from Carter to Obama have sought to find just the right combination in order to sway Tehran away from Ruhollah Khomeini’s doctrine of rigid opposition to "Gharbzadegi" (“Westoxification”). But every attempt to “open up” Iran to a friendlier stance toward the West in general and the United States in particular has been rebuffed.

Why? Has Washington DC simply not found the correct formula yet? Is the correct ratio of carrots to sticks simply too complicated to be applied successfully to the Islamic Republic of Iran? Do we need a political “Einstein” to calculate the breakthrough theorem? Or is something else at play here?

Micah Halpern – writing in a recent op-ed in The Jerusalem Post – states the situation quite clearly:

“As everyone who monitors US foreign policy is painfully aware, American administrations don’t really grasp the reality of the Middle East. …  And don’t blame America for this lack of understanding – it’s a part of America’s DNA.                                                                                                                                                                                            Americans have an innate optimism. They believe that their point of view is the prevailing point of view and they feel that they can convince anyone. And if that doesn’t work, bribery – military aid, monetary aid, UN votes – will.”
Careful students of Islamic Iran and of Islamic fundamentalism in general are aware of what the late longshoreman-philosopher Eric Hoffer termed the “True Believer” as it applies to Iran. In essence, Hoffer identified true belief as a component in the makeup of revolutionaries as well as of totalitarian regimes. Although Hoffer -- writing in 1951 – principally had fascism and communism in mind, his lessons certainly apply to radical Islam and radical Islamist states such as Iran (as well as the Islamic State).  The “true believer”, and the mullah leadership of Tehran is certainly made up of Islamic “true believers”, is not willing to compromise his beliefs for monetary gain. And that is why the United States has not been successful in its efforts to modify Iran‘s revolutionary fervor.

All attempts to sway the mullah regime from its program of spreading the Islamic Revolution are doomed to failure. The Islamic Republic cannot reject this core pillar of Khomeinism (see especially notes 99 and 100) for such would be an admission of failure of the regime to adhere to its raison d’être as an Islamic society as well as a rejection of Islam’s requirement to spread the faith.

In order to remain true to Khomeini’s declaration of “neither West nor East”, Iranian policy under his successor as Faqih (Supreme Leader) –Ayatollah Ali Khamenei --requires it to bear enmity towards both – particularly the West as represented by the “Great Satan” (the U.S.) and the “Little Satan” (Israel). Ali Safavi, president of the Washington DC based think tank “Near East Policy Research” points out in his op-ed of December 14, 2015:

“A few days after the nuclear deal was announced, Khamenei warned, ‘We will never stop supporting our friends in the region and the people of Palestine, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain and Lebanon. Even after this deal our policy towards the arrogant U.S. will not change.’                                                                                                                                                            Iran's medieval regime cannot be reformed because any sign of moderation would provide an opening for the emergence of popular demands, which would mature into protests for democracy.”
As Hoffer indicates “Mass movements can rise and spread without belief in a God, but never without belief in a devil.” And thus the United States remains the necessary “devil” to which the Iranian regime can point as its eternal enemy.

Trying to apply Western marketing principles to a non-Western fundamentalist religious culture is not only arrogant but also foolish as it totally fails to comprehend the mind–set of our opponents. It would behoove our policy wonks to study Hoffer’s text and to read Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s web-site to gain a better understanding of his thinking; he certainly is not playing games and takes his religious beliefs (warped as they may be) very seriously.  His antagonism to the West has not diminished at any time during his career. Maybe our policy “experts” might finally take him at his word?

And lest one think that the next Faqih (Supreme Leader) might be more tolerant, one only needs to look at the recent selections/appointments made to the Guardian Council. Under Ayatollah Aḥmad Jannati, its longtime chairman, the conservative approach has remained firmly entrenched. And now that Jannati has become chairman of the Assembly of Experts, the ultra-conservatives will continue to be able to nominate a like-minded successor to Khamenei when the time comes, possibly even Jannati himself.

In short, it is time for our Iran policy “experts” to leave their ivory towers and realize that their attempts to woo Tehran have been a dismal failure. As Lee Smith has indicated in his 2010 epic The Strong Horse: Power, Politics, and the Clash of Arab Civilizations – even though Iran is not Arab, the same point applies – the Middle-Eastern Islamic world naturally aligns itself with strength, power, and violence. America must be the strong horse in order to reclaim its role there, and that only by understanding the nature of the region’s ancient conflicts can we succeed.

Additionally, as Islamic Civilization scholar emeritus Professor Moshe Sharon has pointed out – when negotiating in the Middle-East – whether shopping in the bazzar or sitting at an international negotiating table – the seller always has an advantage. We have been “shopping” for the last thirty-seven years, and until we learn to restrain ourselves and wait to “sell” instead of buying, we will continue to fail to secure the “bargain” that we seek.



Rabbi Dr. Daniel M. Zucker, author of over one hundred articles on the Middle-East, is founder and Chairman of the Board of Americans for Democracy in the Middle-East, a grassroots organization dedicated to teaching the public and its elected officials of the need to promote genuine democratic institutions throughout the Middle-East region as an antidote to the dangers posed by Islamic fundamentalism. He may be contacted at contact@ADME.ws and/or ADME.chairman@aol.com.
Iraq Threat Assessment
June 24, 2014

by Colonel (Retired) Wesley Martin 

[This text was given to me by Col. Martin at a meeting in Paris with a request to see it published; its publication at Israpundit, American Thinker and Tea Party Tribune resulted.]

Embedded in article by Adam Kredo, “Fmr. Top Iraq Commander: ‘Civil War in Iraq Has Already Begun’”, The Washington Free Beacon, June 30, 2014,

Israpundit, June 30, 2014                                                                                  American Thinker, Tea Party Tribune, July 2, 2014

During my tenure as the senior Antiterrorism/Force Protection Officer for all Coalition Forces in Iraq, I had identified six basic threat groups against us: national terrorists, international terrorists (Al Qaeda and others), former regime elements (Saddamists), religious extremists, criminals, and tribes. It was recognized that some individuals and organizations would fall under more than one threat group.   How each was operating determined its threat group classification.  The tactics and objectives of each group differ from varying degrees.  Even within the groups, differences were identified.  Sunni and Shia national terrorist courses of action differ. As a result of these understandings, threat expectations for current and upcoming coalition missions could be developed.  In turn, defensive measures could be constructed.  There was one additional caveat.  During Operations Iraqi Freedom 1 and 2, any defensive measure taken was allowed to remain in effect for only ninety days. A year later, that window had closed to fourteen days. During those periods, it was found that our adversaries had adapted with new ways to attack.  We needed to continually identify and characterize evolving weaknesses and push effective defensive windows to increased periods of validity.        

By the time General Petraeus wrapped up his mission in 2010, the impacts of all groups had been minimalized.  This was not just because of the surge in forces and how General Petraeus used those forces, but equally important was his concurrent strategy of community and information engagement.  In the north and west, his success with the Sunni tribes resulted in locals ridding themselves of terrorist elements.

Unfortunately, the work of all coalition forces and dedicated Iraqis of all faiths has been undermined.  The antics of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki have resulted in every one of those threat groups being reinvigorated.  Of the six threat groups previously identified, al-Maliki has been the most aggressive and powerful operative in the criminal element.  Little of the hundreds of billions of dollars pumped into Iraq by the United States had a positive impact on the Iraqi population.  Not happy with his share of the skim, Nouri al-Maliki has established a criminal organization far more greedy, corrupt, and brutal than Al Capone could ever have hoped to achieve.  For Capone, the “Saint Valentine’s Day” massacre was the show-piece of his brutality.  For Nouri al-Maliki, mass murder, unjustified warrants and arrests, torture, and overcrowded, disease-ridden, prisons have become a routine attribute of his rule.        
For years, al-Maliki has been conducting genocide on Sunni populations. Anyone opposing him is subject to being assassinated, being declared a terrorist, or wrongly accused of crimes and arrested.  Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi is the most classic example.  During my tour as Senior Operations Officer for Task Force 134 (Detention Operations) I personally worked with Vice President al-Hashemi and we shared equal dedication in stopping death squads from capturing and killing Iraqis just released from American operated detention facilities. Vice-President al-Hashemi did not care if potential victims were Shia or Sunni.  He was determined to do everything possible to stop all the killing. Independent of American operations, he was also working to expose al-Maliki’s illegal and secret prisons.  Yet, immediately after American forces left Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki declared Tariq was organizing death squads and called for the Vice-President’s arrest. Al-Hashemi avoided the mockery of a trial and is now living in exile in Turkey.

Whether on an individual or community basis, al-Maliki’s method of operation is always the same.  Every time he is met with resistance or fears exposure for his crimes, Nouri al-Maliki identifies those who oppose him as terrorists and threats against Iraq.  I was in the auditorium last year during his presentation in Washington D.C.  At every turn he blamed the ills of Iraq on Al-Qaeda.  It was not Al Qaeda inside the Fallujah hospital that his forces recently dropped barrel bombs onto, killing children and one doctor.  

No matter what Nouri al-Maliki has done to his fellow countrymen, he has had the unfailing support of two governments: the United States and Iran.  While U.S. mainstream media was asleep at the switch and all this was going on, the U.S. State Department was operating an information deception campaign in support of al-Maliki.  The most blatant case was the murder of 52 Iranian dissidents trapped at Camp Ashraf.  Fully covered by video footage taken by survivors of the massacre, and even on recording devices undiscovered by the assault forces, Maliki’s elite “Golden Division” passed through two lines of Iraqi security forces and, in full view of guard towers manned by Iraqi soldiers, systemically moved through the camp killing people.  Immediately following the massacre, and later during Congressional testimony, State Department employees claimed “There is no evidence the Iraqi government was involved in the Ashraf massacre.”

The 2010 national elections resulted in supporters of former interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi winning the most seats in parliament. Per the Iraqi Constitution, it was his responsibility to form the government.  U.S. State Department supported al-Maliki in blocking this from happening even though Allawi supported a unified Iraq and opposed discrimination.  Al-Maliki remained in power.  Corruption and genocide continued.  In 2014, both the American and Iranian governments backed al-Maliki’s third term as Prime Minister, even though it is strictly forbidden by the Iraqi Constitution.

To ensure the election went in his favor, just prior to polling, al-Maliki ordered the release of waters from the Fallujah Dam, causing massive evacuations of Sunni communities.  His several military assaults on Sunni communities resulted in many potential voters fleeing to Kurdistan.  Many of those who did return were informed they had no place to vote.  Military personnel were required to vote a day early under direct observation of their commanders. Ballot boxes for other communities suddenly disappeared. Even before the completion of ballot counting, President Obama telephoned and congratulated Prime Minister al-Maliki for his win.

Despite what al-Maliki and Obama administrations claim, the majority of the fighters in northern and western Iraq are not religious extremists or, in this case, the Islamic States of Iraq and Syria.  Elements are clearly there, but valid statistics do not support the proclamation that all these communities are falling to the ISIS. The communities and tribes are in revolt against the corruption and genocide performed by Nouri al-Maliki.  Western governments and media claimed that the ISIS slogan “We have a score to settle” referred to the execution of Saddam.  It did not.  It pertained to atrocities against the Sunni population by the government of Nouri al-Maliki.

What is now happening is that the entrance of international terrorists have caught the support of residents of the north and western provinces – the Sunni population base.  Meanwhile, the wrath of the ISIS is not just against the Shias, but also Sunnis who cooperated with the Americans in years past, and the Iraqi government.  The wrath is also against anyone who does not share Islamic extremist views and will try to minimize ISIS influence in the region and the minds of other Iraqis.  The moderate Sunni tribal and community leaders and elders are in a difficult situation and face the threat of their people being annihilated from two sources – the ISIS and the Iraqi government.  

General Petraeus did an excellent job in developing peace with the Sunni tribal leaders.  Now President Obama is talking about dropping bombs on the very same people and communities that accepted peace.  If that is done, then the United States will have destroyed whatever remains of legitimacy with the Iraqi people.  It will also destroy all credibility throughout the Middle-East. The Obama administration may wish to turn a blind eye to the atrocities of Nouri al-Maliki; however, citizens of the Middle-East know better. American bombs on Iraqi communities and defenders of survival will be a bigger rallying call against the United States than the atrocities of Abu Ghraib could have ever achieved.  

Al-Maliki’s regime is a much greater threat than the United States government appears to understand.  Currently, al-Maliki is arming civilians and militias to defend Baghdad and the Shia south.  That takes us back to the threat groups described at the beginning of this assessment.  Al-Maliki is now arming everyone.  His own military proved a total lack of discipline when thousands of soldiers fled from a few hundred adversaries in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit. Now al-Maliki is creating armed mobs.  It is only a matter of time before these mobs start a genocide campaign of their own.  Civil War in Iraq has already begun.  If proper action is not taken immediately, it will not be long before a Reign of Terror commences.  Religious extremists and criminals will be raiding communities and mass murder will be the result.

That Reign of Terror will not just be between Shias and Sunnis. The tribes and criminal elements will go against each other. Former regime elements will be back in the fight.  One major fact concerning mob violence is it can turn in any direction.  For the past year, bodies have been stacking up and Shia parents have grown angry at having their sons serving in the military returning home in coffins.  Al-Maliki does not have the support of the Shia population as he once did.  Even Moqtada al-Sadr has stated his Mahdi Army will protect only the holy sites and cities. Moqtada has said nothing about protecting the current Iraqi government or his former ally – Nouri al-Maliki. At present, Moqtada is moving elements of the Mahdi Army north to Baghdad.  Iraq has always had a very bad retirement program for previous rulers.  As with the Monarchy and Republic before him, al-Maliki is very subject to being dragged out into the street and publicly executed.  

If allowed to continue spiraling out of control, this upheaval will not stop in Iraq.  Thanks to al-Maliki’s military, the ISIS is much better armed and more maneuverable than before.  Many of these weapons and vehicles will find their way back to Syria.  Under the leadership of Massoud Barzani, Kurdistan will be effectively defended.  Even the Kurdish Peshmerga received a windfall of equipment that will be very useful in the future.  Unlike al-Maliki’s military, the Peshmerga will not run from danger.          

There is a potential solution, and peace can still be achieved, but not until Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki agrees to abide by the Iraqi Constitution, accept the mandated limit of two terms, and remove himself from government. That includes giving up his co-positions as Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior. This will be difficult because al-Maliki knows once he has released control of the Iraqi government, he will be investigated and brought up on charges of crimes against humanity.  A warrant against him has been standing for several years in the Spanish Court.  Al-Maliki knows if tried in his own country, he will be convicted and face the same fate as Saddam Hussein.  

As he either steps down from power, or is dragged out into the streets as in the case of the monarchy, a new ruling coalition needs to be immediately formed. This too will not be easy because the Iranian government wishes to maintain a puppet in Baghdad.  The Sunnis are not going to accept anyone of Tehran’s choosing, nor should they.  If that happens, genocide will just pick up where al-Maliki left off.  

The Sunni tribal and community leaders still have the means to throw out the international religious extremists, bring their own national fighters and tribe members under control, and hold criminals accountable.  Time and lack of proper action is working against them.  Both are also working against the entire Middle-East.  What happens or fails to happen over the next few weeks will soon have an impact on Jordan and Israel as well.

Bottom line:  Nouri al-Maliki needs to leave power willingly or he will be dragged out.  A moderate government needs to be installed. The Sunni tribal chiefs and community leaders need to be supported and their people freed from the threat of genocide – not bombed by United States military as President Obama is suggesting.

Wes Martin
Colonel (Retired), Military Police
Former Senior Antiterrorism/Force Protection Officer for all Coalition Forces
Former Operations Chief, Task Force 134 (Detention Operations)
Former Base Commander, Ashraf, Iraq





Sunday, September 11, 2016

How to Judge the Nuclear Agreement with Iran

by Rabbi Dr. Daniel M. Zucker & Alireza Jafarzadeh
Canada Free Press, The Conservative Papers, July 16, 2015
Early on July 14th, as news of the pending deal between the P5+1 and Iran concerning the Iranian nuclear program was about to be announced, I received the following analysis from my decade-long friend and Iranian politics expert, Alireza Jafarzadeh. In the interests of a careful analysis of the treaty by American officials and the American public—whose lives will be affected by this treaty—I present Mr. Jafarzadeh’s analysis.  Beneath the first letter is one from a few hours later as Mr. Jafarzadeh presented his first thoughts on what has been revealed of the treaty.
It is our obligation as citizens of this republic to be well informed of the policies and treaties that our government makes. This treaty calls for very careful attention and analysis on our part. As Mr. Jafarzadeh indicates, this treaty doesn’t seem to fulfill the mandate to stop Iran’s march to the bomb. But please read his analysis yourself.
How to Judge the Upcoming Nuclear Agreement with Iran?
Inherent Problems with the Agreement:
Even before the agreement is announced, a number of major problems exist.
1.      The agreement will not prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapons capability.
2.      It will not require the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear enrichment infrastructure; it only puts a limit on that infrastructure for the next 10 to 15 years.
3.      It has not addressed any aspects of the long-standing Possible Military Dimension (PMD), prior to the agreement.
What to look for in the upcoming nuclear agreement:
1.      VERIFICATION: The inspectors of the IAEA must have timely and effective access to all suspect sites in Iran, including military (IRGC) facilities. No ability for Iran to deny or delay immediate access. Most importantly the agreement must include, specified arrangement for the sites that have been sought by the IAEA, i.e, Parchin, SPND, and interviews with key scientists, i.e, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Fereydoon Abbasi, to name a few. If access to these sites and individuals are not already worked out, the chances are, they won’t happen anytime soon.

R&D (Advanced Centrifuges): The agreement must disallow the advanced centrifuge R&D, testing, and deployment and bar any technical upgrade and expansion of Iran’s enrichment capacity.
§  POSSIBLE MILITARY DIMENSIONS: The IAEA inspectors must be able to take samples, to interview all relevant individuals, to inspect all suspect sites, and to copy all documents for their investigation of Iran’s past and ongoing nuclear weaponization activities.
§  SANCTIONS RELIEF: Sanctions relief has to be based on the regime’s compliance. Suspension or lifting of any sanctions must be subject to the IAEA confirmation that Iran has taken the key required steps to comply with the agreement, including coming clean on PMD. Non-nuclear sanctions (such as for human rights violations and terrorism) must remain in effect and enforced.
§  ENFORCEABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATIONS: It has to include a mechanism to re-impose sanctions automatically if the regime is found in violation of the agreement, including by denying or delaying IAEA access. No violation is a small violation.

For many Members of Congress, the inherent problems in the agreement are enough to reject it as a bad deal. Others like to wait until they see how the other factors are addressed in the agreement. Verification through anytime/anyplace access to all suspect sites and individuals is perhaps the single most important factor in determining if the agreement could be supported. If the onus would be on the inspectors to prove to a panel why they need to inspect a place, this process defeats the purpose, and should not be acceptable.
Unless and until these issues are clearly and definitively resolved, any agreement with the Iranian regime will not be worth the paper it is written on.
Evaluating Nuclear Agreement with Iran?
Preliminary Observations:
1.      The agreement does not prevent the Iranian regime from having a nuclear weapons capability.
2.      It maintains and legitimizes Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, with some caps for the next 10 to 15 years. It allows the regime to build an industrialized nuclear program with little limitations in about a decade.
3.      It allows the Iranian regime to conduct research and development (R&D) on advanced centrifuges including IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8, which are significantly more efficient. This allows Iran to master its technology and put together a small covert facility with only a few hundred advanced centrifuges, sufficient to produce enough fissile material for a bomb.
4.      It does not provide anytime/anywhere access to suspect nuclear sites, including the military sites. Instead it provides managed access with significant delays, which takes away the surprise element completely, undermining the very purpose of intrusive inspections.
5.      Most importantly, after 20 months of negotiations, the agreement does not include any specific arrangement to inspect the sites that have already been sought by the IAEA, i.e, Parchin, and SPND. Neither does it mention the need for interviews with key scientists,i.e, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, Fereydoon Abbasi, to name a few.
6.      The sanctions relief is massive and includes a large number ofentities and individuals designated by the United States as part of the SDN list, including all major financial institutions, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Qods Force of the IRGC, and individuals such as Qods Force commander Qasem Soleymani. The sanctions relief would give an enormous boost to the Iranian regime’s ability to continue its rogue behavior, beyond economic relief.
7.      It will provide weapons and missile trade relief in 5 and 8 years respectively, which could only help the terrorist and expansionist policies of the Iranian regime, already the world’s leading state-sponsor of terror.
The Way Forward:
1.      Today’s agreement marks only a beginning of the serious investigation, scrutiny and oversight that Congress and foreign policy experts in the United States must undertake in the next 60 days.
2.      Congress should scrutinize the agreement in a bi-partisan way. This is not a partisan issue and must be dealt with based on its merits.
3.      The agreement should not bar the United States from addressing the rogue behavior of the Iranian regime, namely its abysmal human rights record, its support for terrorism and its destabilizing role in the region.


Alireza Jafarzadeh is a media commentator on the Middle East and an active dissident figure to the Iranian government. He is best known for revealing the existence of clandestine nuclear facilities in Iran in 2002. At the time of the revelation, Jafarzadeh served as the chief congressional liaison and public spokesperson of the United States office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). He is currently also the president of Strategic Policy Consulting, Inc., as well as a FOX News Foreign Affairs Analyst
Textbooks Tell the Tale: Iran's Apocalyptic Vision


American Thinker, June 12, 2015

Recently, Yoram Ettinger, a retired Israeli ambassador, published an article in Israel Hayom entitled “Iran’s School Textbooks – Can Congress afford to ignore it?”  The article provides evidence suggesting that Iran, under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his mullah associates and Iranian Revolution Guard Corps followers, is far from moderating its antithetical stance against the United States, Israel, and the West.  That suggestion is hardly news – one only needs to look at any statement from Khamenei or any of his IRGC officers to come to the same conclusion.  What is unusual is Ambassador Ettinger’s use of research carried out by the Institute of Monitoring Peace and Tolerance in School Education to make his point.

Citing Hebrew University professor Eldad J. Pardo’s report, Ettinger points out that Iran’s educational system is intensively preparing the next generation for self-sacrifice in an apocalyptic jihad against the West.  Ettinger astutely indicates that the school curricula of a state reflect the strategy and tactics that it wishes to pursue far more accurately than public statements made by its political and/or military leaders or their diplomats.  Textbooks are the means by which the Iranian regime wishes to mobilize its youth to enlist in its ongoing war – both culturally and militarily – against the West.

Ettinger writes: “Thus, school textbooks constitute a very accurate detector of the nature, mission and legitimacy/illegitimacy of regimes, and their expected use of nuclear capabilities.”  When one adds another crucial point that Ettinger makes – “Apocalyptic regimes are induced – not deterred – by Mutual Assured Destruction” – one sees that the current P5+1 “Framework to Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon” is woefully lacking in teeth to force Iran’s compliance because the Iranians refuse to permit snap inspections at all their sites.

Given the record of Iran’s deceit for over three decades, its attempts to keep the nuclear program completely clandestine, its continued violations of the current U.N. sanctions, its ongoing desire to spread its Islamic revolution far and wide, and its abysmal record on human rights – as well as its endless appetite to support terrorism – it behooves all to reject the current “Framework” deal with its absurd “signing incentive” of $50 billion and quick relaxation of sanctions – the only stick that forced the Iranians to negotiate in the first place.  As Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has frequently said, the alternative to this bad deal is not war; it’s a better deal.  The “Framework” is a bad deal – it will bring nuclear war rather than prevent it.  And as Ettinger demonstrates, that may be exactly what Supreme Leader Khamenei wants.


Rabbi Dr. Daniel M. Zucker is founder and chairman of the board of Americans for Democracy in the Middle-East, a grassroots organization dedicated to teaching the public and its elected officials of the need to promote genuine democratic institutions throughout the Middle East region as an antidote to the dangers posed by Islamic fundamentalism.  He may be contacted at contact@ADME.ws.
Suspected VEVAK Agent Poses as Researcher at Harvard & MIT
by Rabbi Dr. Daniel M. Zucker
Canada Free Press, April 6, 2015
VEVAK 1 (Farsi: Vezarat-e Ettela’at vAmniat-e Keshvar) is the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (abb.: MOIS) of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Its principal occupation is intelligence, but unlike the CIA—its rough American equivalent—VEVAK also functions much like the FBI; in effect, VEVAK operates very similarly to the Soviet Union’s KGB. Within VEVAK there is a department whose primary purpose is the dissemination of disinformation2 Iran regularly uses its diplomatic personnel and nationals abroad to further the objectives of the MOIS.3 Iranian diplomats are trained in a very similar fashion as were those formerly in the USSR. And they must pass Islamic loyalty tests and be vetted for their Islamic loyalties as well as loyalties to the regime. No Iranian “diplomat” is assigned abroad until his credentials pass rigorous inspection by VEVAK.
This essay seeks to unmask a suspected agent of VEVAK, working as a researcher in two of America’s premier institutions of higher learning, Harvard and MIT. It intends to refute his assertions made recently.
About two weeks ago, The National Interest published an essay entitled “How Iran Became the Middle East’s Moderate Force4 by an Iranian former diplomat, Dr. Mansour Salsabili 5. Salsabili claims that the Islamic Republic of Iran, under the current rule of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayed Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani, has changed radically since its founding in 1979 by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Rohallah Khomeini, having matured politically so that today it should be considered “moderate” and “rational”. Let’s see whether his case holds up or not.
Salsabili begins his essay by stating “Yet, three major indicators highlight a deep development in Iranian politics in the region. These signposts include Iran’s constructive regional military presence; its peaceful and balancing role in resolving politico-cultural issues within the UN and regional venues; and its highly educated and modernized society that guarantees the irreversibility of the other two developments.”6Dr. Salsabili, are you serious? Iran is stoking the fires of war throughout the entire region7. In Yemen8, in Lebanon9, in Syria10, in the Palestinian territories (both Gaza11 and the West Bank12), in the Sudan13, and in Iraq14. Iran is building an “empire15 by using its Shiite proxies16 and Hamas17 to attack its targets.
Dr. Salsabili: do you inhabit an alternate universe? Just where is Iran “resolving politico-cultural issues within the UN and regional venues”? Ali Khedery—the longest continuously serving American official in Iraq and special assistant to five American ambassadors to Iraq and senior adviser to three commanders of U.S. Central Command—doesn’t seem to think that Iran has acted in the way Salsabili suggests; indeed, he says just the opposite: the U.S. needs to “curtail Iran’s destabilizing regional hegemonic ambitions and its drive toward developing a nuclear weapon.”18
As regards “its highly educated and modernized society that guarantees the irreversibility of the other two developments”, I grant that Dr. Salsabili is correct in saying that Iran has a “highly educated and modernized society”, but given the fact that Iranian youth and society in general find themselves under increasing pressure from the regime to adhere to strict Islamist practice19, I question the viability of his statement.
Salsabili claims that Iran is the only nation that is aligned with the United States in opposing the Islamic State.20However, Jordan21 is involved in attacking the IS and the Kurds both in Syria and in Iraq are bearing the brunt of the ground war against IS.22 Iran’s IRGC Qods Force officers have been leading the Iraqi militias in the battle for Tikrit23, but that offense stalled and needed the U.S. to step in and take it over.24 So too, Egypt 25 has attacked IS in Libya. Is Iran the “sole partner” of the U.S.‘s attempt to eliminate the Islamic State? Nope.
In his third paragraph Salsabili claims that the Islamic Republic of Iran has retreated from its original goal of spreading the Shiite revolution beyond its borders to create a Shiite empire throughout the Middle-East and beyond and now only wishes to defend its own borders. Given Iran’s recent boasting of having conquered four Arab capitals26, it seems that Salsabili is out of step with the Supreme Leader27, or just downright disingenuous.
In his fourth paragraph, Salsabili continues his completely twisted presentation of history, claiming that Iran has acted moderately and cooperatively with the United States in a variety of situations over the last two decades. He says: “Take, for example, Iran’s tacit cooperation with the United States during the Afghanistan campaign against the Taliban, its calming and controlling of Shiite extremists in Iraq, its role as a middleman between Azerbaijan and Armenia, compelling the Assad regime to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and dismantle its chemical arsenal, its firm stance against the ISIS extremists in Syria and Iraq and its avoidance of radicalization on a range of regional issues, from Chechnya to the Bahrain uprisings. The professional behavior of the Iranian and the U.S. navies in the Persian Gulf over the last two decades is another example of the possibility for harmony and cooperation in the region.”
Let’s begin with the question of cooperation against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Eric Park’s report for CENTCOM28, “Iranian Weapons Smuggling Activities in Afghanistan” demonstrates that Iran has provided Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) to the Taliban; it’s been quite some time since Iran had a major feud29 with the Taliban so the lie has been put to Salsabili’s claim about cooperation there. As regards “calming and controlling Shiite extremists in Iraq”, Clay Wilson’s report to Congress30, “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures” would appear to disarm Salsabili’s claim when it says: “Since October 2001, improvised explosive devices (IEDs, roadside bombs, and suicide car bombs) have been responsible for many of the more than 3,000 combat deaths in Iraq and many of the more than 240 combat deaths in Afghanistan. ...Department of Defense (DOD) officials have also charged that Iran may be supplying new IED technology to insurgents in Iraq.”31 So too, it is reported that Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Iranian-backed Shiite militias “are killing our troops32 in Iraq with sophisticated weapons that include lethal armor-piercing versions of IEDs and rocket-boosted mortars. Need I say more? As regards making peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Geoffrey Gresh’s report33, “Coddling the Caucasus: Iran’s Strategic Relationship with Azerbaijan and Armenia” indicates that Iran has sided with Armenia against Azerbaijan, and the burgeoning Azerbaijan-Israel relationship34 certainly hasn’t improved Azeri-Iranian relations. So, another assertion, rejected. “Compelling the Assad regime to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and dismantle its chemical arsenal”—the facts would seem otherwise as a 2014 report35 indicates. Well, what about Salsabili’s suggestion of Iran’s “avoidance of radicalization on a range of regional issues, from Chechnya to the Bahrain uprising”? Chechnya—guess again, as Con Coughlin reported36 a decade ago. Well, maybe Bahrain? Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service recently wrote:37 “Bahrain’s primary foreign policy concern has been Iran. Bahraini leaders, with some corroboration from U.S. and other statements, blame Iran for providing material support to hardline, violent factions in Bahrain. Bahrain has supported Saudi and UAE criticism of Iran not only for its purported activities against Bahrain’s government, but more broadly for Iran’s unqualified support for pro-Iranian Shiite movements and governments in the region.”
Maybe, Salsabili might be correct that “the professional behavior of the Iranian and the U.S. navies in the Persian Gulf over the last two decades is another example of the possibility for harmony and cooperation in the region.” Naval history scholar David Crist testifies that following an April 2011 incident between an IRGC speedboat and the British HMS York, the U.S. Navy suggested that a hot-line be set up between the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and the Revolutionary Guard in Bandar Abbas (Iran) to help defuse any accidental incident arising at sea. Iran refused to discuss the proposal, saying: “The only reason for conflict in the Persian Gulf is the presence of the U.S. Navy. If they leave, there is no conflict.”38
Suggesting that Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Hamas in their “struggle” against Israeli “occupation forces” is only part of a universal Muslim concern for Iran’s Palestinian brothers sidesteps the issue. Israel maintains control over parts of the former Jordanian West Bank; the former Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip is now under the aegis of the Muslim Brotherhood- associated Hamas, not the State of Israel. Iran’s belligerent support of Hamas has already been noted above.
Claiming that Khamenei is mellower than Khomeini isn’t saying much; besides, the Supreme Leader hasn’t issued afatwa against the activities of the Qods Force or against the perpetrators of the Charlie Hebdo massacre. President Rouhani simply provides Khamenei with convenient “window dressing”—we’re still waiting to hear the Supreme Leader say that the massacre was a violation of Islamic law.
And yes, the youth of Iran today are very different from their parents who backed the Islamic revolution in 1979, but the youth are not in control of the government, nor do they have the guns, as was demonstrated so sadly in the failure of the “Green Revolution” of 2009.
Dr. Sansabili requests an end to sanctions and respect for “legitimate technological needs”. A saner approach to his demands would require verifiable inspections upon demand and proof of Iran’s changed attitude towards its regional neighbors, Israel, and the United States. As long as the regime refers to one as the “Little Satan” and the other as the “Great Satan”, Iran has not changed its behavior or its attitude to the West. Rewarding it in any way at this point is plain and pure capitulation. Sunset clauses at this point are simply putting an extended-time fuse on an Iranian nuclear bomb. No thanks! And the current proposed treaty doesn’t even take up the question of Iran’s development of ICBMs.
My deduction is that Dr. Salsabili works as an agent for VEVAK, given his essay, despite his professed interest in non-proliferation. But whether he is or isn’t, his conclusions should be rejected completely.
Footnotes:

  1. For a detailed report on VEVAK, see: Federal Research Division, “Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security-VEVAK: A Profile”, Library of Congress, December 2012, https://fas.org/irp/world/iran/mois-loc.pdf. Additional articles on VEVAK can be found on the web site of Americans for Democracy in the Middle-East. See “Press Reports” at www.ADME.ws where the following articles by this author are listed:
    “Disinformation Campaign in Overdrive: Iran’s VEVAK in High-Gear”, Global Politician, September 4, 2007, “Iran’s VEVAK Disinformation Inc.”, Global Politician, September 17, 2006, and “Iran’s Foreign Agents of Disinformation
    More About VEVAK”, Global Politician, November, 14, 2006.Iran’s Foreign More About VEVAK
  2. Clair Lopez, Raymond Tanter, et. al., “White Paper—U.S. Policy Options for Iran: Sham Elections, Disinformation Campaign, Human Rights Abuses, and Regime Change”, IPC [Iran Policy Committee}, June 30, 2005. See p. 7 and the IPC report’s endnotes #1 and #2 on p.23.
  3. Ibid. See its endnote # 3.
  4. Mansour Salsabili, “How Iran Became the Middle East’s Moderate Force”, The National Interest, March 20, 2015.
  5. Dr. Salsabili is currently a visiting scholar at the MIT Center for International Studies where he conducts research on establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, as well as a research associate at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs where he serves as an Associate for the International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom, accessed March 28, 2015. See also: Moderndiplomacy.eu, accessed April 5, 2015.
  6. Mansour Salsabili, op. cit.
  7. Riyadh Mohammed, “How Iran Is Taking Over the Middle East”, The Fiscal Times, March 18, 2015.
  8. Steve Inskeep, “Is There Evidence That Yemeni Rebels are Backed By Iran?”, NPR Radio, March 27, 2015. See also: Nussaibah Younis, “The Saudi-Iran powerplay behind the Yemen conflict”, The Guardian, March 27, 2015, Brian Bennett and Zaid al-Alayaa, “Iran-backed rebels loot Yemen files about U.S. spy operations”, Los Angeles Times, March 25, 2015, and Bruce Reidel, “Saudi anguish over Iranian gains”, Gulf Pulse, Al-Monitor, March 23, 2015.
  9. Jonathan Masters and Zachary Laub, “CFR Backgrounders: Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah)”, Council on Foreign Relations, January 3, 2014.
  10. Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer, “Iranian Strategy in Syria”The Institute for the Study of War, May 2013.
  11. —-, “Iran confirms military aid to Hamas, sending long-range missile technology”, RT News, November 21, 2012.
  12. Mehrdad Moarefian and Amir Toumaj, “Iran News Round Up - November 25, 2014”, AEI Critical Threats, November 25, 2015, (See section “Official statements: Khamenei hailed the Iranian nuclear negotiations team and reiterated call to arm Palestinian resistance groups”, especially bottom of the section presenting statements from the Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of Grand Ayatollah Khamenei)
  13. Al Arabiya with Agencies, “Sudan-Iran ties eyed as Israel says Khartoum aids Gaza arms smuggling via Egypt”,Al-Arabia. October 25, 2012.
  14. Martin Chulov, “Qassem Suleimani: the Iranian general ‘secretly running’ Iraq”, The Guardian, July 28, 2011, See also: Michael B. Kelley, “Iran’s Military Mastermind Is ‘The Leader Of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, And Yemen”,Business Insider, December 5, 2014.
  15. Abdullah al-Thuweini, “Tehran official: ‘Baghdad is capital of new Persian empire’”, al-Araby, March 10, 2015.

    See also: Jonathan Spyer, “The Middle East: In the Shadow of the Gunmen”, PJ Media, April 4, 2015, ormeforum.org.
  16. Jonathan Spyer & Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamim, “How Iraq Became a Proxy of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, The Tower, Issue 21, December 2014.
  17. See note 10, above.
  18. Ali Khedery, “Lost in the Middle East”, Politico Magazine, August 12, 2014. See especially page 3, Section 5: “Identify your enemies—and confront them”.
  19. Elliot Friedland, “Fact Sheet: Human Rights in Iran”, The Clarion Project, 2014 (?), , and David Menashri, “Reform Versus Radicalism in the Islamic Republic”, in Current Trends in Islamist ideology Vol. 10, Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, October 18, 2010. See especially pp. 67-70.
  20. Salsabili, op. cit.. See his second paragraph.
  21. Alastair Jamieson and Ziad Jaber, “Jordan Tells ISIS That Revenge Airstrikes Are Just ‘The Beginning’”, NBC News, February 6, 2015. See also: Micah Halpern, “The Cold War Between Jordan and Syria Heats Up”, New York Observer, February 11, 2015.
  22. Sylvia Westall and Raissa Kasolowsky, “Kurds battle Islamic State in Syria, U.S.-led coalition jets strike”, Reuters, March 14, 2015, and Jane Arraf, “Kurdish president weighs broader role in Islamic State fight”, PBS, March 11, 2015. See also: Dilar Dirik, “The ‘other’ Kurds fighting the Islamic State”, Aljazeera, September 2, 2014, and Vivian Salama and Bram Janssen, “Westerners join Kurds fighting Islamic State group in Iraq”, AP, February 4, 2015.
  23. Jack Moore, “Tikrit Offensive Stalls Due to ‘Hundreds’ of ISIS Explosives”, Newsweek, March 23, 2015.
  24. Luis Martinez and Alexander Mallin, “Tikrit Offensive: Iranian General Steps Out, U.S. Steps In”, ABC News, March 26, 2015.
  25. David D. Kirkpatrick, “Egypt Launches Airstrike in Libya Against ISIS Branch”, The New York Times, February 16, 2015. See also: Holly Yan, “Egypt’s President: It’s time for an Arab coalition against ISIS”, CNN, February 23, 2015.
  26. Davud Doud, “The Rise of the Iranian Empire”, The Tower Magazine, Issue 23, February 2015.
  27. See notes 11 and 14, above.
  28. Eric Parks, “Iranian Weapons Smuggling Activities in Afghanistan”, CENTCOM/Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, 2010 (?).
  29. Wikipedia, “1998 killing of Iranian diplomats in Afghanistan”.
  30. Clay Wilson, “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures”,Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, August 28, 2007.
  31. Ibid, See “Report Summary”.
  32. David Wood, “Iranian Weapons ‘Killing Our Troops’ in Iraq, U.S. Says” The World Post, July 7, 2011.
  33. Geoffrey Gresh, “Coddling the Caucasus: Iran’s Strategic Relationship with Azerbaijan and Armenia”, Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 1 (1), Winter 2006, pp. 1-13.
  34. Gallia Lindenstrauss, “Israel-Azerbaijan: Despite the Constraints, a Special Relationship”, INSS Strategic Assessment, Volume 17, No. 4, January 2015, pp. 69-79.
  35. Associated Press at the United Nations, “Syria discloses four secret chemical weapons facilities, UN says”, The Guardian, October 7, 2014.
  36. Con Coughlin, “Teheran ‘secretly trains’ Chechens to fight in Russia”, The Telegraph, November 27, 2005.
  37. Kenneth Katzman, “Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy”, Congressional Research Service, February 20, 2015, See “Summary”.
  38. David Crist, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran, The Penguin Press, New York, 2012, p. 360.